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ABSTRACT 
AN ANALYSIS OF SARRAFS CREDIT NETWORKS IN ISTANBUL (1844-1863) 
 
Emir Torlak, Canan 
MA, Department of History 
Advisor: Prof. Engin Akarlı 
September 2015, 66 Pages 
 
This thesis is a work on the sarraf networks in Istanbul, which developed and 
expanded in the Tanzimat era and played a significant role in the Ottoman financial 
system. Sarrafs were a part of the guild organization in the Ottoman Empire. 
Originally, they were engaged in supplying silver to the Imperial mint.  monetary 
exchange and supplying silver to the Imperial Mint. Changes in the financial 
mechanism such as the formation of a new monetary regime in the Ottoman Empire, 
the growth of the budget and the intensification of financial relations have caused 
sarrafs to become credit institutions supplying funds to the Imperial Treasury and 
state. The sarrafs became an important group that utilized their own capital as well as 
deposits to finance the taxfarming sector on which the Ottoman financial system 
rested. 
The sarrafs functioned as a mediator between the officials in the taxfarming 
sector to whom they supplied credit and depositors. The Imperial Mint sarraf registry 
number 167 covers many disputes between these parties in the years 1844-1863. These 
data enable us to to analyze the financial profiles of hundreds of people who were 
sarrafs, tax-farmers (mültezims) and depositors (mudi’s) according to their social 
categories. The inclinations of change in these profiles, the difference between these 
disputes’ quality and frequency, and the graphs prepared to show the factors affecting 
them indicate the total volume of Istanbul sarrafs registered in this registry as well as 
those who died, went bankrupt or fled. Accordingly, developments that led to 
bankruptcy or fleeing of the sarrafs and the disputes that followed are much more than 
those who died. 
Keywords: İstanbul sarrafs, The tax-farming system, The Imperial Mint. 
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ÖZ 
İSTANBUL SARRAFLARININ KREDİ İLİŞKİLERİNİN ANALİZİ (1844-1863) 
 
Emir Torlak, Canan 
MA, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Engin Akarlı 
Eylül 2015, 66 Sayfa 
 
Bu tez Osmanlı mali siteminde, sağladığı fonksiyonlarla kuşkusuz önemli bir 
statüye sahip olan İstanbul sarraflarının Tanzimat döneminde geliştirmiş ve 
genişletmiş oldukları ilişkilerinin incelenmesine yönelik bir çalışmadır. Osmanlı esnaf 
örgütünün birimlerinden olan sarraflık, imparatorlukta ortaya çıkışı 15.yüzyıl olarak 
kabul edilmiş, başlangıçta para değiş tokuşu yapan ve Darphaneye gümüş tedarik eden 
bir meslek grubudur. Osmanlı devletinde meydana gelen para rejimi, bütçenin 
büyümesi ve parasal ilişkilerin artması gibi mali mekanizmanın geçirdiği merhalelerin 
sonucu olarak sarraflar, devletin ve hazinenin ihtiyaç duyduğu nakdi sermayeyi 
sağlayan kredi kurumu haline gelmişlerdir. Osmanlı maliyesinin istinat ettiği iltizam 
sektörünün finansmanında da çok önemli fonksiyonları olan sarraflar, bu finansmanı 
sağlayabilmek üzere, kendi öz sermayeleri ile birlikte büyük ölçüde mevduatı da 
değerlendiren bir gruptur.  
Bu grubun kredi sağladığı iltizam sektöründeki görevliler ile kendisine 
mevduat yatırmış olan tasarruf sahipleri arasında üstlendiği aracılık fonksiyonu 
dolayısı ile oluşan çok çeşitli ihtilafların davaları ile alakalı 1844-1863 yıllarını 
kapsayan 167 nolu Darphane sarraf defterinin sağladığı veriler vasıtasıyla sarraf, 
mültezim ve mudilerden oluşan yüzlerce şahsın ait oldukları sosyal kategorilere göre 
mali profillerini analiz etmek mümkün olmuştur. Bu profillerdeki değişme eğilimlerini 
ve davaların/ihtilafların niteliği ile frekanslarındaki farklılaşmaları ve bunların 
faktörlerini ortaya koymak üzere hazırlanan grafikler, zikredilen defterde kayıtlı olan 
İstanbul sarraflarının iflas ve firar edenler ile ölmüş olanlarının sayısı ve toplam işlem 
hacmini göstermektedir. Buna göre, sarrafların iflas ve firarına sebep olan gelişmelerin 
ve akabinde ortaya çıkan anlaşmazlıkların, ölen sarraflarınki ile karşılaştırıldığında 
çok daha fazla olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İstanbul sarrafları, İltizam vergi sistemi, Darphane-i 
Amire. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the Ottoman Empire adopted and practiced religious law together 
with its prohibition of interest, the socio-economic life and necessities of the state’s 
finances forced it to de facto acceptance of interest – although not de jure. Though we 
do not have information about the preliminary years, after the end of the 15th century, 
under concepts such as muamele-i şer’iyye, vech-i helal-i şer’i and nehç-i mer’i üzere, 
ilzam-ı rıbh-ı şer’i that do not enter the category of legal interest, and with a limit of 
one year in contracts, the state permitted interest. Such contracts were strictly to be 
made in the presence of a kadı. It can be understood from the related registries that 
taking interest was legally and officially banned, in the case of contracts between 
individuals that were not made before a kadı. We understand from these contracts that 
de facto interest was very widespread, and a maximum limit of 10 to 15% was set after 
the 15th century. We also know that certain pious foundations were established under 
the same terms.1 
 This limit was preserved in the following centuries. The deeds of wany 
foundations indicate that interest rates, or what they called rıbh, normally did not 
exceed 15%. Another important practice in legalizing interest was the conversion of 
the wealth of orphans into cash in order to invest it profitably. Under the same limit, 
interest was legitimized. 
 In order to ensure the welfare of all its subjects living in a wide area and with 
a social structure of low-density population where rural areas reached 80% of the total, 
the Ottoman Empire had created an economic system that depended on a ‘narrow-
regional equilibrium system’ sustained by provisionism. 2  In this system, kazas 
represented the regions that had to balance their production and consumption. Any 
good that was produced within the region was not allowed to exit the region without 
first satisfying the needs of the region. This was the “basic principle of economic 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1 Jon E. Mandaville, “Faizli Dindarlık: Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Para Vakfı Tartışması,” trans. Fethi 
Gedikli, Türkiye Günlüğü 51 (Yaz 1998), 129-144; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Edirne Askeri Kassamına Ait 
Tereke Defterleri (1556-1659),” Belgeler, 3 (1966), 31-46. Discussions about the monetary 
foundations’ legality in the Ottoman Empire. 
2 Mehmet Genç, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi, 11th Edition, (İstanbul: Ötüken), 2014, 
49-68. 
2 
policy” adapted from the 16th century to the 19th century. Although not implemented 
everywhere and to a full extent, the existence of such a principle caused self-sufficient 
structures rather than market relations to develop and settle. Consequently, together 
with a scarce population, monetary relations were low in volume. Under such 
circumstances, hiring paid personnel for tax collection would be a very expensive 
solution. The principle credo of the Ottoman Empire was, however, to tax the 
population as low as possible. For this reason, it chose two methods of taxation. The 
first was the tımar system. This system made possible, without the need for market 
relations, the formation an army and police force that could live in the production zone 
and take their salaries out of the taxes they collected. The cash income required by the 
central state was supplied still the end of the empires by auctioning the task off the 
multezims, who operated as private enterpreneurs and cost less both economically and 
financially. However, the state also tried to ease the side effects that increased the tax 
burden of the public by centuries long legal and corporal regulations trying to reform 
the tax-farming regime. 
 Privatization not only dropped the cost of taxation for the state, but because the 
mültezim would try to maximize profits by lowering expenditure, it was cost effective 
in the macro scale as well. 
 However, the mültezim needed cash funding in order to collect taxes, which 
were mostly in kind and then sold them to obtain cash needed to pay the treasury. 
Mültezims who almost always came from the ranks of the military personnel could not 
find the required amount of money without paying interest for it. That is why the state 
had to allow interest in practice. Instead of taxation through salaried workers that 
increased costs for both the state and the public, it chose the tax-farming system, which 
inevitably led to this consequence. 
 As the tax-farming sector grew in the second half of the 16th century, the 
funding required by the sector also grew. It was not possible to gather funds with a 
15% interest rate, which was set because of socio-economic necessities through 
muamele-i şer’iyye in order to fulfill the demands of the pious foundations and funds 
for orphans. So the state allowed a 20-25% interest rate for sarrafs specializing in 
iltizam finances. From the 17th century to the middle of the 18th century, the interest 
rate was 20-25%. After the 1740’s, it was fixed at 20% and this rate did not change 
until the end of the Tanzimat era.  
3 
 During these dates, every state official that took on tax-farming and turned into 
a mültezim worked with a sarraf who paid his expenses. Both had a registry and in it, 
the payments were recorded daily, and the interest was added daily. Seldomly called 
faiz but often güzeşte or rıbh, this amount was certainly added. The payments of the 
mültezim-paşa were also recorded and the same way interest was calculated and added. 
What is interesting is that the interest rate taken by the sarraf was the same as the 
interest calculated for the customer. Both were 20% from 1740 to 1850. One might 
ask how did a sarraf profit, then? This is because the sarraf lent credit at high amounts 
and for long periods, thus increasing the volume of the interest he took. In return, the 
sarraf collected deposits from different groups, including managers of orphan wealth 
and pious foundations. He paid interest to the depositors as well, but not more than 
15%. 
When disputes arose between private individuals whom the state allowed to 
acquire credit under the name muamele-i şer’iyye, in the presence of a kadı the parties 
would appeal to the kadı. The kadı would accordingly accept interest as legitimate 
within the terms of the contract. There are many examples of this situation.3 
However, sarrafs who charged more than 15% and recorded them with a 
chronometric day schedule were not handled by the kadı in the event of a dispute. 
These were settled in a special court that contained no kadıs or naibs. Although the 
elements of the court changed, a kadı was never present, only bureaucrats and officials 
of the sarraf and tax-farming guilds. 
The Imperial Mint registry number 167, which I am analyze in this thesis, is 
about this subject, namely the disputes between sarrafs and their customers. The 
committee that solved the matter was headed by kapukethüdas of provincial 
administrators called hacegan who were members of high bureaucracy. The committee 
included the sarrafs’ kahya and leaders of the sarrafs. The chief of the court, the Head 
of the Imperial Mint transmitted the decision to the Head/Director of the Privy Purse 
(Hazine-i Hassa Nazırı) and then to the Minister of Finances (Defterdar) and the 
grandvizier (Sadrazam). After that, the sultan was informed and his approval turned 
the decision into a decree. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
3 Certain kadıs might well have refused to approve a transaction that involved interest. Nevertheless, 
the government recognized only the kadis as authorities in the handling of such cases. 
4 
This work, with the help of data from Imperial Mint Registry number 167, aims 
to examine the relations of sarrafs with different social groups through the years 1844 
to 1863. 25 sarrafs are selected for analysis out of the 130.  The selected sarrafs were 
those died, went bankrupt or fled. The reason behind choosing these sarrafs is to 
determine was the full inventory of their credit relations. The main concern here was 
not to repeat known thoughts on the Ottoman financial system or the famous Istanbul 
sarrafs, but to take advantage of the different perspective these registries allow us in 
evaluating the subject. Thus this worksheds light on sarrafs working as credit 
institutions, how they operated with interest, the existence of Muslim and non-Muslim 
women depositors, and how sarrafs served as deposit banks as well, the problems that 
resulted from a sarraf’s bankruptcy and how they were solved. By approaching sarrafs 
as such, we may obtain data that are presented analytically in the second and seminal 
part of this work. 
This work is divided into two main chapters. The first chapter contains general 
evaluations of networks of traders in the Ottoman Empire. The structural form of the 
sarraf associations, their features and privileges are discussed. The following part 
discusses the integral functions of the sarrafs in the Ottoman financial system 
discussed. How money exchanging and silver supplying transformed the sarrafs of 
Istanbul into credit institutions is explained in reference to changes in the Ottoman 
economy and politics. The Istanbul sarrafs discussed in this part differed form the 
Anatolian and Rumelian sarraf groups by function and quality. Their importance in the 
Ottoman financial system is emphasized. 
The second chapter analyzes the data from the Imperial Mint registries. I was 
able to analyze and draw out the financial profiles of the 25 sarrafs under survey in 
detailed graphs and tables. The graphics represent the data in the registry visually and 
make our claims, clearer. The main purpose of this work is to approach the existing 
sarraf literature in a new perspective and to evaluate the Istanbul sarrafs as a network 
and supply informative data. 
Two important events that required the inspection of sarrafs books were death 
and bankruptcy. Starting in 1844, it took 20 years for the accounts to be completed. 
Two different groups were designated for deaths and bankruptcies. Their differences 
and similarities were determined. The total volume of capital by 25 sarrafs regarding 
the tax farming in the Ottoman financial system was given in detailed graphs and 
analysis.  
5 
In this work, I have used qualitative and quantitative methods to interpret and 
evaluate data obtained. In the first chapter, secondary sources on sarrafs in the 
Ottoman Empire were used to qualitatively analyze the general features and functions 
of the sarrafs within the Ottoman financial system. Accordingly, the general 
occupation of the sarrafs, their identity as an institution, their functions and their 
relations have been analyzed in order to give meaning to the tables and graphics. With 
this purpose, the information in the first chapter regarding the credit network 
consisting of men, along with the deposits made by women have been useful. 
According to this, the most important function of the sarrafs, the iltizam system, was 
funded as a credit institution and the most dependent of the credit seekers were men 
and mültezims, as seen in the graphs. 
The transcribed archive, which was used in the second chapter of this thesis, to 
determine how the Imperial Mint register should be evaluated showed that according 
to these values, the sarrafs had to be evaluated with respect to their credit relations. 
First, out of the 130 sarrafs, 25 were dead, bankrupt, or had fled, and were 625 cases 
among these groups have been chosen. An excel file was opened for these sarrafs and 
tables were created to show their transaction volume, gender, ownership, title, 
occupation, debts, and claims. After 25 sarrafs were filed this way, they were gathered 
in a folder. This way, out of the 25 sarrafs’ transaction volume, the total number of 
women, men, Muslims, non-Muslims, whether they had titles and occupations through 
the tables were determined. The close relations of the sarrafs and their relations with 
creditors and depositors are also shown via graphics. 
As a result of the graphical data, out of the 545 elements in the transactional 
volume of the sarrafs 446 were men, 63 women, 13 institutions, 12 orphans and 11 
communities. With respect to religion, men, women, orphans and non-Muslim 
institutions make up for 525, with 312 being Muslim and 213 non-Muslim. The 20 
remainders are community of which religion is unknown and 9 institutions (see Fig. 2 
and 6). Additionally, only men were given titles, amounting to 301, and with 145 
untitled make up for a total of 446 men as anticipated. It is important to note that ağa, 
efendi, bey, paşa, hacı and çavuş show Muslim titles while hoca denote non-Muslims. 
Women were not added to this group (see Fig. 3, 4 and 5). Occupations in relation to 
sarrafs were determined one by one by scanning relevant cases, and their numbers 
given (see Table 1). 79 different occupations and their relations with the sarrafs would 
not reveal any useful information, so these occupations were grouped into 8 categories 
6 
according to their similarities and their relations with sarrafs were explained (see Fig. 
13, 14). 
The graphs in the second chapter need be distinguished from one another. This 
is because, while the first part evaluates the relations of the sarrafs with institutions 
and persons, the second part consists of graphics showing the accounting between 
sarrafs and persons or institutions. In this part, dead, bankrupt or fled sarrafs and their 
claims, debts, deposits and their relations were evaluated. In the total volume of 
transactions, when one looks into the financial relations between the 25 sarrafs and 
545 people, the amount of credit issued by the sarrafs is 16.945.553,5, while their debt 
is 23.041.052 kuruş (see Fig. 18). To cite debts as a general deposit is possible within 
their relations with women (see Fig. 22, 27) while this is not possible with other 
monetary relations (see Fig. 31). All men who are titled hoca are non-Muslims and 
sarrafs, which is why they cannot deposit any money but only loan credit.  
The objective of the tables and graphics composed of the data of the registry is 
to show that an archive may be evaluated via different methods. The second chapter is 
composed of visual elements that were formed with great care from the data from the 
registry. This source, which is the basis of my thesis, was not only transcribed and 
evaluated with a descriptive method, but the text that was formed after the transcription 
was evaluated with a quantitative method. This is why it will fill an important gap in 
the literature. 
One of the first and foremost works on the sarrafs in the Ottoman Empire is a 
master’s thesis by Araks Şahiner.4 This work evaluates the sarrafs as a tradesman 
network includes the Ottoman archives and Armenian literature. To mention the 
tradesman network in general, the work starts with the functions of sarrafs and 
evaluates them as an important part of the Ottoman financial mechanism, as well as 
their socio-political roles. It is frequently emphasized that sarrafs financed the iltizam 
system through credit, their responsibilities towards the darphane and their position as 
a deposit institution. However, no evidence is given to support this claim. It is obvious 
the sarrafs needed a source other than their own capital in order to fund credits, but to 
classify these as deposits, one needs further archive testimonials.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
4 Araks Şahiner, “The Sarrafs of Istanbul: Financiers of the Empire” (MA Thesis Boğaziçi  University, 
1995) 
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Although not on the sarrafs directly as in the work of Şahiner, there is another 
work by Ömerül Faruk Bölükbaşı on darphane-i amire.5 This work emphasizes in 
detail the darphane-i amire’s role in money printing and as treasury, which are two of 
its most important functions. The sarrafs are considered facilitators of gathering gold 
and silver, and subsequently the Istanbul sarrafs are investigated. The sarrafs’ 
structural features as a tradesman network are evaluated in this work, and it is of great 
importance to understand the responsibilities of the darphane. 
Similar to this thesis, all works on sarrafs with Assist. Prof. Dr. Şevket Kamil 
Akar depend on the transcribed archives of the darphane catalog. 6 However these 
works only describe the transcribed text in a descriptive fashion, and there is no 
quantitative analysis of these data. In its current form, the data from the registry is 
more a monotonic description rather than analysis. This is because the data unveils the 
relations of the sarrafs, and shows the groups that had relations with the sarrafs, thus 
their numbers and volumes are in a qualitative manner rather than analysis. On the 
other hand, this thesis does not use a descriptive method in third chapter, but a 
quantitative analysis method of the data is given in the tables and graphics to prove a 
new method in this subject.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
5 Ömerül Faruk Bölükbaşı, 18.yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Darbhane-i Amire, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları, 2013).  
6 Halil Köse, “140 Numaralı Darphane Defterine Göre Osmanlı Devleti’nde Sarraflar” (Yüksek Lisans 
Tezi İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2010).; Bülent Kulüp “120, 143 ve 165 nolu Darphane Defterlerine göre 
19.yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Darbhane-i Amire ile İlgili Düzenlemeler” (Yüksek Lisans Tezi İstanbul 
Üniversitesi, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 2 
SARRAFS AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL 
TREASURY 
  
In the first section of this work, I will evaluate the system of guild organization 
in the Ottoman Empire and review the features and privileges of sarrafs in terms of 
their occupation and guilds organization. The first questions that come to mind are the 
possible reasons of a demand for the servizes of sarrafs the empire and how the sarrafs 
carried out their trade to meet these demands. It is therefore useful to widen the 
boundaries of sarraf term in reference to the financial and political development of the 
empire. This is because the area of activities covered by the sarrafs in the early periods 
and the extent of the changes in its essence after the 18th century was evident. 
After a short evaluation of the structural features of the sarrafs, it is important 
to examine and discuss their function within the Ottoman treasury. Thus this will be 
the main focus of the present chapter, along with the rest of the work. At this point, it 
must be noted that the cause for the expansion and development of the functions of the 
sarrafs were caused by the changes in the method of tax collection in the Ottoman 
financial system. The financing of the tax-farming system (tax farming) by the sarrafs 
quickly transformed them into credit institutions and increased their relations with 
officials. 
 Consequently after all these developments, certain unforeseen problems arose 
between the state and the sarrafs. The probable causes for these problems were the 
high risk of the sarraf profession and the fact that the sarrafs were primarily affected 
from any damages occurring as a result of the warrant given by the sarrafs to the 
officials and mültezims (tax farmers) in the second degree. 
 
2.1. A Short Glance at Guild Organization in the Ottoman Empire 
9 
 It is not within the scope of this work to analyze the structure of trades in the 
Ottoman Empire in-depth. But it is important to mention some key features in order to 
understand the Ottoman trade system and the position of the sarrafs in it. 
 Although there is no conclusive or detailed evidence as to where and when the 
Ottoman traders’ organization started, İnalcık believes that its foundations go back to 
the 16th century groups of artisans and traders that formed as based on fütüvvet 
principles in each city.7  As trade group is defined in its most basic sense, as an 
association of artisans or traders who specialized in at the same line of work producing 
a good or service in cities or towns as a means for living. Those working in same trade 
group were organized into different subunits, but needed to be united by a senior 
management in order to remain connected with each other. The operation of this group 
relied on rules that were agreed upon by its members themselves. These regulations 
were then submitted to a judge (kadı) for registration and working them official. The 
judge investigated whether these rules were against the (religious) Law, legislation, 
customs and traditions, and would then submit them to the Imperial Council. Any draft 
that was to be approved by the Imperial Council became binding for the members of 
the organization.8 By preparing and approving such documents, the state was able to 
keep the order within each trade group network individually and in the marketplace as 
a whole. The state was able to control the trade groups (esnaf) and was informed of 
any structural changes in their regulations periodically. From a contemporary point of 
view, this signifies that the state had standardized the traders’ operations and thus kept 
under supervision a social group not played prominent role in the forming of social 
structure. Placing great importance to organizations, the state gave financial and 
judicial rights and liabilities to trader associations during their establishment. This 
way, the state was able to achieve two important goals, namely to oversee the needs 
of the population and set appropriate prices for goods and to services.9 
 Privilege rights (gedik hakkı) were of utmost importance to the traders and 
sarrafs, as will be discussed in the following pages. These were important signs 
pointing to the development of organizational progress in the process of trades and 
crafts in Ottoman cities. This is because in this system, the state determines particularly 
who will conduct a profession and how many people will work in a trade through the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
7 Halil İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London, 1973), 151. 
8 Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, 289-292. 
9 Ahmet Kal’a, “Esnaf ,” Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi 11 (1995): 423-430. 
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regulations of trade groups. There are some fundamental regulations as to how the 
mechanism will work, viz. how many stores a trade group is allowed to open, the 
inheritance of the privileges of a deceased traders by his son, or if he does not have 
any, by a traders deemed fit by the senior management of the trade group.10 To further 
investigate the matter, it is possible to view the case of sarrafs closely. Privileges11 
show that the state intended to create balance and order within the trade associations 
or groups by certain restrictions. It also shows that the state has adopted the process of 
crafts and trades in a professional manner. 
 It is important to note that the Ottoman trade networks had more functions than 
just providing goods and services for the population to fulfill demands. 12 
 Representatives of the trade groups network acted as administrators of the 
group and as mediator between the members of the group and the state, thus helping 
the state enforce its basic agreed upon regulations unto its members. It is the traders’ 
networks that narrated and transmitted the regulations and orders pertaining to its own 
structure to its members as a mediator. Alongside these, the state used the network to 
collect taxes, thus collecting taxes and not burdening the treasury. The kethüda and 
yiğitbaşı helped the state in enforcing the narh prices negotiated and authorizedby 
judges, quality control of goods, and implementation of sanctions against the traders 
who broke the regulations and laws. Due to varied factors, starting at the end of the 
18th century, there was shrinkage of Ottoman trader associations. One of these was the 
growing volume of foreign trade. In retail businesses, new actors such as foreign 
merchants and trade agents replaced Ottoman traders in the city economy. Trader 
associations continued its presence until the Tanzimat period despite the restrictions 
of the state and increasing taxes and liabilities. 13 
One last point may be raised before we conclude this discussion on trade 
associations as a background to understand sarrafs: ownership of the trade group. The 
state organized the tradesman network as distinct guilds that are made up of small units 
                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Ahmet Kal’a, İstanbul Esnaf Birlikleri ve Nizamları (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür 
A.Ş, 1998), 51.  
11 See. Engin D. Akarlı, “A Bundle of Rights and Obligations for Istanbul Artisans and Traders, 1750-
1850,” in Law, Anthropology and the Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things, ed. Alain 
Pottage and Martha Mundy, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 166-200. 
12 Gabriel Baer, “Monopolies and Restrictive Practices of Turkish Guilds,” Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient, 13 (1970): 151. 
13 Genç, Devlet ve Ekonomi, 299-300. 
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so they may operate in an egalitarian manner as communities. 14 The trade associations 
were not subject to ethnical or religious discrimination. Researchers agree that trade 
branches had a varied dynamic.15 The fundamental diversity of the Ottoman Empire 
has led the trader networks to have a similar diversity. A trade that is dominated by a 
single group was very rare. For example, Muslims performed debbağlık exclusively, 
and the profession of sarrafs attracted only non-Muslims.  
 I will evaluate sarrafs’ privileges and the features of sarraf organizations in the 
Ottoman Empire with regards to the general features of the trade associations I have 
summarized above. 
 
2.1.1. An Example of Guilds in the Ottoman Empire: The Sarrafs. 
 It is accepted that data on sarrafs in the Ottoman Empire date back to the 15th 
century.16 Instead of explaining the meaning of sarraf as a term, we will describe the 
position they held within the Ottoman Empire as a trade group and how their duties 
and job changed, because our aim is to shed light on the transformation processes.  
 The sarrafs in the Ottoman Empire were located mainly in Istanbul. They 
profited from the differences in the value of foreign and native currencies that were in 
circulation under different names and different types and carats. Sarrafs acted as 
intermediaries in the buying and selling of these currencies. Although they started out 
with exchanging and buying-selling of currencies, they eventually became an integral 
part of the Ottoman financial system. Therefore, it will be helpful to discuss the 
changes in the Ottoman economical system that led to the expansion of the sarrafs’ 
position within the Ottoman Empire, and how these developments contributed to the 
changes in the position and organization of sarrafs. 
The sarrafs started to expand in the Ottoman Empire during the late 17th 
century. The years of 1683 through 1699 were particularly important. The empire was 
at war with several European states that formed an alliance. There was a massive 
financial crisis and changes were implemented that raised the importance of sarrafs in 
the Ottoman financial system. The first of these changes was a monetary reform that 
embraced new and domestic money within the empire. As the monetary regime 
                                                                                                                                                                    
14 Ibid., 43. 
15 Araks Şahiner, “The Sarrafs of Istanbul: Financiers of the Empire” (MA Thesis Boğaziçi  University, 
1995): 71. 
16 Ömerül Faruk Bölükbaşı, “İstanbul Sarrafları (1691-1835), Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi 30 
(2014): 19. 
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changed and domestic money dominated the market through broad emissions, the 
business of the sarrafs grew.17 This reform introduced the kuruş system and caused 
monetary relations to increase in the market. This important development in the 
monetization of the economy necessitated that the Ottoman government put millions 
worth of money pressed in the mint to the market and to ensure the validity of its own 
currency throughout the empire. 
 What was more important for the sarrafs was that the national treasury had a 
sudden buildup. During mid-17th century years, the national budget was about 500 
million akçe. However after the 1690’s, it surpassed one billion.18 Previously, foreign 
currencies circulating in Ottoman markets were wiping out Ottoman money. This 
circulation increased the currency exchange function of the sarrafs. With the growth 
of the budget, the volume of the dealings that involved the sarrafs increased and 
strengthened the sarrafs. This must be why though we have very few data regarding 
the sarrafs before the 17th century but abundant data starting with the 18th century.  
 The swift and nearly twofold increase in the budget caused the sarrafs to grow 
as well. The growth of the budget continued after it showed a 100% increase at the end 
of the 17th century.19 In principle, the instantaneous growth of the emission volume 
and the addition of mukataas continued to increase the budget. Especially after the 
1760’s, more money than half the revenue of the national budget was put into 
circulation each year. Monetization expanded, budget grew and the sarrafs continued 
their transactions at the same interest rates. With more individuals, the volume of deals 
increased and along with income-expense accounts, the sarrafs grew and were able to 
obtain great profits.  
 It must be noted here that sarrafs required more capital than other traders 
because they needed to buy and sell valuable goods and lend credit to tax-farmers 
within the Ottoman financial system. The privileged interest rates allowed to the 
sarrafs were a necessity for the economy and the treasury. The imperial treasury would 
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 Şevket Pamuk, “Money in the Ottoman Empire,” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman 
Empire 1300-1914, eds. Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 966-
968. 
18 Erol Özvar, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Bütçe Harcamaları 1509-1788,” in Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar ve 
Bütçeler, eds. Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar, (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 
2006), 218-297. Genç and Özvar have published many charts on budgets for the mentioned dates in this 
work. 
19  For details on the growth of budget bkz. Ahmet Tabakoğlu, Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı 
Maliyesi, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1985). 
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not survive otherwise. Although sarrafs are considered in the trade business, the profit 
margin allowed for other tradesman and merchants was about 10%, while the sarrafs 
were allowed a profit margin matching the interest rate allowed them at around 20-
24%. The most decisive cause of this consequence was that the sarrafs had an 
important role as creditors of the tax-farming sector and a means of its operation. 
 The starting point of the association is accepted to be 1691, when they were 
given gediks (privileges) as the first stages of their organization.20 We do not have any 
information about any privileges given them in the earlier periods. The newly 
published İstanbul-Galata-Üsküdar and Eyüp court registries contain no information 
on sarrafs prior to the 18th century and there has been no other work done using 
different source material. Because of the lack of information based on sources in 
Armenian we were unable to include these sources despite the fact that most of the 
sarrafs were of Armenian descent. New works taking into account Armenian archives 
will surely help us acquire newer and broader information on the subject. Accordingly, 
Hagop Barsoumian, in his work relying primarily on data provided by Armenian 
historians, has made important remarks on the sarrafs prior to their arrival to Istanbul.21 
What he had in mind, perhaps, was the means by which Armenians came to Istanbul 
and how they established an exchange business because the sarrafs needed to have 
certain savings in order to fulfill the mentioned duties of a sarraf. 
 Known formerly as Eğin, Kemaliye was a mountainous district unfit for 
agriculture. Armenians who were engaged in trade largely occupied it. They would 
trade vegetables and fruits they grew with grain from the neighboring villages, while 
some other merchants brought goods from Halep and Istanbul in order to sell them to 
other villagers. Eventually, some Armenian merchants who lent money to their 
customers stepped out to collect these debts, functioning like sarrafs. These Eğinian 
merchants saved the earnings they obtained from these credits in order to accumulate 
capital. They then used their capital to exchange money and valuable goods. Their 
intent was to become sarrafs that lent credit to state officials.  
 Regarding the interest practice; as far as we know, the Ottoman government 
had legalized interest beginning in the 16th century under such names as muamele-i 
şer’iyye, and ilzam-ı rıbh in agreements made in front of a judge. The maximum 
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 Bölükbaşı, “İstanbul Sarrafları,” 24. 
21 Hagop L. Barsoumian, Amiralar Sınıfı (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2013), 70-72. 
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amount of interest accepted by the state was 15% in the 16th century.22 Monetary 
foundations23 as credit corporations and the property of the orphaned were allowed 
interest provided that it did not exceed 15%. Though the maximum was 15%, the 
minimum rarely dropped below 10%. There are many examples of monetary 
foundations generally using 10% to 15% interest rates. Timur Kuran has posited that 
a 14.1% nominal interest rate was widespread and accepted throughout the 17th century 
by evaluating many examples regarding interest deals.24 
 Despite this, the maximum interest rate allowed to the sarrafs was 25%. This 
number did not change until the second half of the 18th century.  Beginning with the 
first half of the 18th century, it fell down to 20% and did not change until the 1850’s. 
Sarrafs would use the assets of the monetary foundations and orphanages as loans 
while giving credits at an interest rate of 25% or 20% beginning with the 18th century.25 
 While sarrafs gave loans and credit, they accepted investments as well. It is 
thought that they paid investors an interest of about 15% they lent credit at an interest 
rate of 20%. Without a doubt, the difference between these rates helped them 
accumulate capital. 
 
2.1.2. The Structural Features of the Sarraf Association and Their 
Privileges 
The first data in the Ottoman archives about the institutionalization of the 
sarrafs date back to 1691. 26  Alongside privileges and institutionalization, the 
transformation of the sarrafs we may find the all the way to 15th century must be the 
entailment of the changes and problems of the period. On the other hand, there is an 
evident lack of sources on this subject. The high number of sarrafs in the İstanbul, 
Üsküdar, Eyüp and Galata region that were not supervised properly would cause 
confusion in the market and the financial system. This confusion would lead to a lack 
                                                                                                                                                                    
22 For the explicit Divan verdict on this rate bkz. BOA. Mühimme Defteri 5/s.33-darphane.78 (14 M 
973) 11.08.1565. 
23 Jon E. Mandaville, “Faizli Dindarlık: Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Para Vakfı Tartışması,” trans. Fethi 
Gedikli, Türkiye Günlüğü 51 (Yaz 1998), 129-144; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Edirne Askeri Kassamına Ait 
Tereke Defterleri (1556-1659),” Belgeler, 3 (1966), 31-46. Discussions about the monetary 
foundations’ legality in the Ottoman Empire. 
24 Timur Kuran, Mahkeme Kayıtları Işığında 17.yüzyıl İstanbul’unda Sosyo-Ekonomik Yaşam, eds. 
Timur Kuran (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2013), 10-12. 
25  Süleyman Kaya. “18. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Toplumunda Kredi” (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Marmara 
Üniversitesi, 2003).  
26 Bölükbaşı, “İstanbul Sarrafları,” 24. 
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of valuable goods for the Imperial Mint to acquire. Consequently, a privilege was 
given to them and they were limited in number in order to avoid confusion. According 
to this new solution, 12 sarrafs were officially registered in the Istanbul Imperial Mint 
by name, and 12 anonymous yamaks (helper) were given to them as staff. Whoever 
the sarrafs accepted would be recorded as yamaks so only a total of 24 sarrafs were 
allowed to practice the profession of sarrafs. 27 
 As it was the case with many occupational groups, the state placed a limit on 
the number of individuals practicing a trade to control it. The case of sarrafs was much 
more important to the state than other groups. The state was required to constantly 
intervene in the growing number of non-privileged sarrafs as they were operating 
illegally and caused instability. Between the years of 1691-1733, sarrafs were 
constantly given nizams (regulations) because it was a profession with a high profit 
margin that was desired by many individuals to benefit from the difference between 
the interest rates for buying cheap deposits and lending. The mentioned dates 
correspond to the first growth period of the sarrafs. The main reasons behind the 
numerical increase of the sarrafs are the changes in monetary regime, increase in 
monetary relations and growth of the budget. This way, the sarrafs increased in number 
and their functions became deeper and intensive. 
 We are able to acquire information about the liabilities of the sarrafs through 
the regulations given to them. After the interventions and controls, it was determined 
in 1712 that 40 sarrafs and 10 silversmiths were to be added, and they would sell 
36,000 dirhems to the Imperial Mint at a lower price than the usual market rate. The 
same regulation dictated that if a sarraf were to supply silver to anywhere but the 
Imperial Mint, their assets would be seized and they would be incarcerated.28 In the 
year 1739, the number of sarrafs increased to 72 so they would supply the Imperial 
Mint with 400 dirhem per person, thus accommodating the changes in the market.29 
Individuals from other occupations such as bakers, cup makers and perfumeries were 
barred from secretly practicing the business of the 72 sarrafs.30 
 From the very beginning, these regulations required the sarrafs to sell a certain 
amount of silver to the Imperial Mints at a specific price in retain for certain privileges. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
27 BOA. MAD. 3861, 23. 
28 BOA. MAD.1673, 186-188.  
29 BOA. MAD.10339, 213. 20 Ra 1152 (27 Haziran 1739). 
30 BOA. MAD. 9979, 185. 16 R 1169. 
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However, the sarrafs complained of selling silver to the Imperial Mint at a lower price 
than the going market rate. Subsequently, beginning in 1740, they were to make a 
certain amount of cash payment instead of silver. The monthly payment of 750 kuruşes 
of cash by the sarrafs was called iştira bedeli. 31 For every privilege, 10 kuruş were 
paid to the Imperial Mint. Because of the long war of 1768-1774, the sarrafs were 
unable to pay the monthly bill of iştira because of their poor financial situation. Some 
abandoned their work and fled. Although the right to use a sarraf shop could be there 
was no one who actually was willing to pay the monthly fee. They were to pay the 
4,087.5 kuruşes that accumulated in five years and pay five kuruşes instead of 10 until 
they had their job in order.32 After 1821, the price of iştira was re-raised to 10 kuruşes 
and the sarrafs were obliged to pay a further muaccele upfront in order to acquire a 
sarraf shop. However, we do not have information as to when this condition was 
enforced and what the preliminary amount was. A document dated 1835 shows us that 
the amount of muaccele paid by a first class sarraf was 7,500 kuruşes for a first time, 
or 5,000 if it passed on to his son. Second class sarrafs had to pay 1,500 for the first 
time and 1,000 kuruş if it passed on from father to son.33 In other words, the privilege 
of working as a sarraf was different from the same privilege in other guilds, as one had 
to pay a certain fee (muaccele) for the privilege to pass on from the father to the son. 
This privilege was certainly one of the most important elements in the sarraf 
occupation. However, it was not enough to pay the muaccele to acquire the privilege 
of working as a recognized sarraf. The sarraf needed to meet other criteria in order to 
be qualified in obtain that privilege. Being trustworthy, having a strong capital and 
financial profile, a shop where he and his helper would process transactions were a 
few of these requirements. This information would be registered into the baş muhasebe 
and an acknowledgement of the sarraf’s privilege to work as a sarraf would be given 
to him.34 
 The most important of these regulations that concerned the sarrafs were those 
issued in 1835. This legislation split sarrafs into two groups as first and second-class 
                                                                                                                                                                    
31 Bölükbaşı, “İstanbul Sarrafları,” 23-24. 
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sarrafs.35 It is strongly possible that this happened because the demand towork as a 
sarraf grew and new elements doing the same work were added to the list. According 
to 1844 count of the traders and artisans in Istanbul, there were 94 sarrafs, 76 brokers 
(poliçeci) and 300 jewelers in operation. 36  
 Sarrafs were a trader group connected to the Imperial Mint. According to the 
1762/63 legislation, sarrafs were required to warrant each other, provide services such 
as cizyedar, mültezim to the state, not allow any outsiders into their business while 
observing the structure they were in, sell gold and silver to the Imperial Mint and 
provide valid and right money of all sorts in exchanges.37 
Lastly, I have to comment on regulaitons related to the working conditions of 
sarrafs. I have already mentioned that sarrafs were allowed an assistant. From this we 
understand that sarrafs had partners. We can clearly observe this in the sarraf registry 
I have examined in the Imperial Mint catalog.38 Sarrafs were engaged in corporate 
partnerships as well, although not in the modern sense of the word. Sarrafs would 
process their transactions individually in this partnership, which had no legal status.39 
Sarrafs, who accepted deposits and worked with interest, would appeal to the 
Imperial Mint in the case of a dispute.40 An individual who had a problem with a sarraf 
would also appeal to the Imperial Mint.41 Similarly, lawsuits on debts were handled 
under the inspection of the Imperial Mint. When Şabcı Buhur, a merchant, in Valide 
Han complained that, he could not collect the money sarraf Kaspar owed him the 
transactions were inspected by the Imperial Mint’s stewards of sarrafs kethüda and 
other respected sarrafs. They determined that Kaspar owed Buhur Yahudi 109,000 
kuruş. Subsequently, it was arranged for the debt to be paid in 4 years in 4 
installments.42 As the example shows, the debtor was not put under pressure and the 
debt was divided into parts for easier payment. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
35 Halil Köse, “140 Numaralı Darphane Defterine Göre (Darphane. 1251-1260/1836-1845) Osmanlı 
Devleti’nde Sarraflar” (Yüksek Lisans Tezi İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2010): 19-25. It is possible to see the 
names of first and second class sarrafs as tables in the mentioned pages. 
36 BOA, C.İKT., 1686.; BOA, C.MAL., 20477. 
37 BOA, C.DRB., 2714. 
38 1844-1866 (Darphane.1260-1283), BOA, D.DRB.d (Darphane Sarraf Defteri), nr.167.  
39 2 Mayıs 1804 (21 Muharrem 1219), BOA, D.DBŞM.DRB.,14/104. 
40 BOA, MAD.,10254, 22 (26 Eylül1808). 
41 BOA, C.BLD.,486 (8 Ağustos 1833). “Papazoğlu Vasil ve oğlu Yani, esnaf tarafından Imperial Mint 
Nazırı Nafiz Efendiye verilen mahzarla esnaflıktan çıkarılıyorlar. Kısa sürede mevcut işlerini tasfiye 
edecek ve bir daha sarraflık yapamayacaklar” 
42 BOA, MAD.,10263, 12 (28 Mayıs 1815). 
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 When talking about sarrafs, usually an important point is missed: the existence 
of Muslim sarrafs. The sarraf occupation was in its essence a monetary business, and 
required expert knowledge of exchange rates between very various domestic and 
foreign currencies, and their quality. In this occupation, there was no difference 
between Muslims and non-muslims regarding knowledge, experience and expertise. 
There were Muslims that had knowledge of the profession, as well as Muslim sarrafs 
that took part in institutions that had large transactions such as the Istanbul port, Izmir 
port or the Halep tax collecting (muhassıllık). However, there were no Muslims in the 
credit institutions that capital holders formed and received and gave interest.43 
 Another important remark is on the time and location of the sarrafs. This is 
because sarrafs were primarily located in inns within the city walls (sur içi), operating 
in rooms and shops. Although it is a widespread conception that the sarrafs moved 
outside the wall in the 18th century especially to Galata, Bölükbaşı has showed the lists 
in his article that even in the beginning of the 19th century, the operations inside the 
city walls continued.44 
 I have tried to show the general features of the Ottoman tradesman network 
and the sarraf tradesman within it, the contents of their occupation and their 
development in this short introduction. We see that the sarraf institution started off as 
a financial and economic necessity in the Ottoman Empire. In the same way, I 
explained their occupations prior to coming to Istanbul and how they started this 
occupation with the use of limited sources. The next part inspects the sarrafs change 
from money exchangers to a credit institution. 
 
2.2. The Function of Sarrafs in the Ottoman Treasury 
 In this section, changes that occurred in the Ottoman tax system and paralellel 
changes in the functions of the sarrafs are evaluated. The beginnings of the sarraf rest 
on supplying silver and gold to the Imperial Mint. In the following period, the Ottoman 
tax collection process changed and the tax-farming system formed. With this 
development, I argue the sarrafs became an integral part of the financial mechanism. 
As much as they were credit institutions supplying state officials with credit, sarrafs 
were at the same time a bank of deposit, thanks to people who deposited money to 
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them. There is an abundant amount of data on credits and interest rates between sarrafs 
and individuals to whom they supplied credit. On the other hand, we have nearly no 
information on the interest rates or amounts in the relation between the sarrafs and 
their creditors.  
 Subsequently, the effects of the Anatolian and Rumelian sarraf groups on the 
state’s financial system as a means of easy tax collection are the last remarks I will 
add within the limits of this work. It was only possible through the work of Barsoumian 
that covers broadly the Armenian literature, the establishment of Anatolian and 
Rumelian groups that caused a characteristic change in the structure of sarrafs.  
 
2.2.1. Sarrafs as Financers of the İltizam System 
 Before establishing a connection between the sarrafs and their most important 
function in the tax collection method called tax-farming, it is important to discuss the 
liabilities of sarrafs towards the Imperial Mint. The sarraf had certain commitments to 
the state from the beginning, but these commitments changed over time.  
 Those sarrafs who were given a privileged status by the state were now 
registered and thus controlled. Since the organization of sarrafs into an exclusive 
association sarrafs became an element of control in the financial system. They 
primarily supplied the necessary financial support to state officials such as cizyedar, 
mültezim and malikaneci.45 As we have mentioned earlier, when we think about the 
profit margin allowed in the Ottoman financial system, large capital savings and an 
institution that would fnance this system in the empire was needed in order to carry 
out the tax farming and malikane system. Sarrafs played an important role in this 
matter, using their capital in this system in exchange for a profit margin allowed by 
the state. 
 In earlier periods, the sarrafs were played an important role also in money 
exchange, which made up the vast majority of their activities and business. This is 
because they pledged to use the sikkes minted by the Imperial Mint and called sags, 
genuine in the transactions instead of the defective coins (nakıs sikke) that threatened 
the stability of Ottoman currency and was widely used on the market and shopping 
and was withdrawn from circulation with the will of the Imperial Mint.46 Sarrafs 
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performed important function by collecting this gold and silver the circulating of 
which was illegal and giving it to the Imperial Mint. In areas where there was no sarraf 
to execute this function, mukataat multezims and muhassıl-ı emval performed it.47 
The Ottoman economy had a system dependent largely on taxes collected from 
agriculture produce, as it was typically the case in pre-industrial economies. Any 
problem that could arise in such an economy was also true for the Ottoman economy, 
such as the difficulties in the collection of taxes, communication and transportation, 
storage of taxes collected in kind, their exchange into cash, transmission of the revenue 
to the central treasury, and the payment of state officials and other expenses. The 
Ottomans adopted the tımar system in the early years of the empire in order to deal 
with these problems. With this system, the state entrusted the tımarlı sipahis win the 
task of collecting the taxes in their own specific areas where they provided 
administrative and military services. These officials, who were part of the economical 
and political order in their respective areas, also protected the source of tax and the 
general population in their own interest. Together with this, the government needed 
cash money for the central army, navy and other expenditures. In order to fulfill this 
demand, the state adopted the tax-farming system alongside the tımar system.48 For 
this reason, three points were important for the tax farming: auctions and competition 
to maximize the revenue steady flow of the treasury and payments. The asl-ı hazine-i 
hakikiye is the guarded treasury. 
We must define the tax-farming system that is used together with the sarrafs in 
its most basic form and determine where it stands within the system, and how the 
sarrafs were integrated with it in time in order to understand the changes in the function 
of sarrafs. Although we don’t know exactly when tax-farming began, we see its first 
examples in the 15th century and have reason to believe that may have started it earlier. 
It is possible to define tax farming as follow: 
It is a warranting, generally confined to a location, of the collection of taxes 
mukataa that location or expresses that location as a financial unit. A warranter 
or mültezim agrees to pay an annual amount paid in cash and mostly 
determined by auction. Multezims take the profit above this amount and meet 
the losses as well. The agreement was valid for a predetermined time.49 
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49 Mehmet Genç, “Osmanlı İltizam Rejimi ve Değişmeleri,” Active Dergisi özel eki, Activity, (Kasım-
Aralık 2001): 6-7. 
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According to the tax-farming method, the highest bidder and most trustworthy 
mültezim would pay the cash he owned to the treasury thus supplying the treasury with 
cash while holding the rights to operate the mukataa for a certain period of time. The 
status of the sarrafs in the tax-farming sector can be clearly seen in the definition of 
tax farming and the guarantorship it required. In the beginning iltizams were limited. 
When a growing part of Ottoman lands turned into mukataas over time, sarrafs too 
became important as a network of credit institutions and a part of the tax-farming 
regime. Many people of diverse backgrounds, non-Muslims, Muslims, the general 
population, soldiers, natives and foreigners alike, became involved in tax farming. 
Both filling a hole and clashing with the tımar system, the tax-farming system 
expanded a long with changes occurring in the world economy and the growth of cash 
economies. New tax items were added to those collected through tax-farming and new 
taxes, money adulteration, and confiscation appeared as possibilities the Treasury’s 
need for cash. 
 The sarrafs were able to adopt the full role of guarantor by supplying the tax-
farming regime with cash capital. Most importantly, the sarrafs had financial power. 
Sarrafs stood out not only with their capital in the tax-farming sector, but also with 
their associational structure formed like a bank. They transfered money to and from 
rural areas to central business districts, thus supplying cash the treasury needed in a 
short time.50 When more mukataas were added to lands subject to tax farming, more 
sarrafs were needed as well. To prevent the subversion of tax sources by leaving 
mukataas to one mültezim’s disposal and transforming sources that were not 
previously mukataas into mukataas, the malikane application was adopted in the end 
of the 17th century. Accordingly, the tımar system was revived through the malikane 
system. An important source of revenue was added to the treasury. The malikane 
system became an important step in the constitution of a social and economic structure 
together with the protection of the general population. Like all new applications in the 
Ottoman system, the malikane too can be considered a compound of tax-farming and 
tımar regimes. It is similar to the tımar system in the sense of relying on prediction of 
the future yields, and to tax farming in that the follow of cash payments remains 
unhindered.51 
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2.2.2. Sarrafs as Credit and Deposit Institutions 
 The role of sarrafs in economic life was multifaceted. Operating similarly to 
modern banks, sarrafs accepted deposits, and mediated any kind of high scale 
payments. They had a business relation with the state treasury with high officials with 
high incomes and others. Thus the documents at hand indicate that, for example, an 
official in Istanbul would pay a monthly fee to sarrafs for regular payments to his 
family (Harem).52 Ordinary sarrafs and treasury sarrafs or kuyruklu sarrafs had their 
respective areas of activities.53 
 Ordinary sarrafs were the group other than the sarrafs I refer to as credit 
institutions that exchanged money and profited from the difference between the values 
of these transactions.54 Privileged sarrafs who were part of association could work in 
their own shops if they had the necessary capital. If not, they were allowed only to 
work with other sarrafs. Thus having a privileged status was important for sarrafs. On 
the other hand, respected sarrafs or the treasury sarrafs were closer to the treasury 
rather than Imperial Mint. They were referred to as merchant or merchant (bezirgan) 
sarrafs. They had more capital than the regular sarrafs and supplied finances to the tax-
farming system. Khans and covered bazaar where cities commercial activity was 
carried out had sarraf rooms. The registries they kept are a valuable source of 
information regarding the nature of disputes between sarrafs and their customers as 
well as interest rates and relations between sarrafs.55 
 Treasury sarrafs were also called kuyruklu because the government gave them 
special permits and privileges. Thus, these sarrafs were able to work with the state 
treasury after paying a warranty fee.56 
 Sarrafs worked together with the mültezims who collected taxes in rural areas 
in the tax-farming system. This is because the mültezim had to provide a guarantor to 
the treasury in order to assure payments. These were sarrafs who had financial power 
and capital. If the amount was not paid or there was a problem, the state would address 
                                                                                                                                                                    
52 BOA, C.DH., 2796. 
53 Cezar, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Sarraflar,” 181. 
54 Ibid., 182. 
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the sarraf directly whether or not the mültezim was rich. 57  The sarrafs not only 
financed the state treasury, but they were long-term tax collection rights in a specific 
region also financers who undertook tax-farming duties. Those who obtained a 
malikane were high ranked officials. The majority of them were senior bureaucrats, 
soldiers or politicians. These individuals did not have a steady income. They were 
given some has and mukataas and they would benefit from these. They were financed 
by the sarrafs but in coordination with the state treasury. Generally high-ranking 
administrators kept a home in Istanbul and left their families there to go to rural areas. 
Sarrafs financed the family budget, paid their debts in shops and furnishers. Just like 
a bank, they undertook the daily cash payments of these individuals. This situation 
may be have emerged earlier but it expanded after the 18th century. 
 They paid the salaries of state officials, took on tax farming in the provincial 
mukataas. Like entrepreneurs or mültezims needed money, they used to work as 
mültezims, the sarrafs financed them. The Ottoman state permitted interests on a de 
facto basis starting in the 16th century. With the increasing volume of transactions, 
sarrafs became mediators between notables, the Treasury and those who held tax 
collection rights (malikanecis). This strategic status strengthened their power and 
increased their numbers. The Imperial Mint registry number 167, which I evaluate 
shows us that the volume of the transactions that sarrafs had with generals was larger 
than that of any other group. Therefore, generals and high-ranking officials had an 
important role in the strengthening of sarrafs and vice versa. Subsequently, a general 
who was in tax farming business relied not only on his own wealth, but also on the 
financial power of his sarraf, who undertook the role of guarantor. 
 The most important basis of sarrafs was the financing of tax farming. The 
traditional Ottoman economic system had very limited private savings options. The 
sarrafs were the only group of merchants that were allowed in this area because they 
used these savings to supply the Ottoman financial system with credit. The sarrafs 
grew both in number and capital, along with tax farming but their importance was not 
limited to financing tax farming. 
 They also played an important role in supplying credit for the circulation of 
internal debt bills called esham in the 18th century, even supplying the treasury itself 
with short-term credits directly. 
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 We have enough information to determine the nature of persons who received 
credit and borrowed from sarrafs. However we have very little information about the 
investors who lent money to sarrafs. The Imperial Mint registry I have chosen as the 
subject of this work contains data that show for the first time that we may develop an 
idea on the subject. 
 
2.2.3. Anatolian and Rumelian Sarraf Groups 
The function of sarrafs in the Ottoman Empire underwent profound changes 
with the Tanzimat era. The first of these changes was the ban of the tax-farming 
system. Taxes were collected by muhassıls who were officials with salaries. This 
caused the main area of operation of the sarrafs to be abolished in the tax-farming 
sector. Consequently, sarrafs were deprived of a line of work from which they 
benefited for a long period and hence they found themselves many centuries, in a 
difficult position. With this change, salaried officials collected taxes, which were 
transferred to the center in cash or by bills through foreign merchants who had begun 
to enter the internal markets, in addition to external trade. The state organized 13 head 
sarrafs in two groups as the only official authority in transferring taxes on 17 May 
184258 in order to save the sarrafs and prevent the domination of foreign merchants. 
These groups were called the Anatolian and Rumelian groups. For the first time in the 
history of the Ottoman Empire, they were given more privileges than foreigners. This 
group, which was distinct from the sarraf merchants, did not hesitate to pay 1.5% 
commission for domestic money transfers for the sake of patronage. However 
foreigners were able to transfer money much cheaper through trade. Despite all the 
efforts and incentives of the state, the sarrafs did not or could not find a niche in trade 
relations. Consequently, they failed to compete with foreigners and ended their 
operations in 1852. What is more important is the failure of salaried officials in 
collecting taxes in the Tanzimat era. After 1842, the state reverted to the tax-farming 
method and so the troubled years of the sarrafs ended. 
 
2.3. Confiscation of Sarrafs’ Estates 
I have mentioned that sarrafs and mostly the Armenian sarrafs, performed 
important functions in the Ottoman financial system. Although this occupation had a 
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good reputation and generated high profits, it also had its risks such as being subjected 
to confiscation of wealth death sentence, and bankruptcy. Sarrafs who undertook 
financial duties could become an object of speculative accusations. Mistakes that have 
led to accusations and intentional counterfeits might lead to accusations.59 Moreover, 
the state might confiscate all the property of a deceased sarraf, thus punishing his 
family. Confiscation as a term implies the transmission of a public servants’ private 
property upon his death for inspection, punishment or precaution. Confiscation was 
practiced in the Ottoman Empire since Mehmed II era in two ways: through death or 
punishment. Some confiscations accompanied exiles.60 One example is the exile of 
Catholic Armenian sarrafs of the Ottoman sarrafs to Ankara. Some mild punishments 
were the deprivation of a sarraf from privileges or expulsion from the occupation.61 
 It must be stated that the method of confiscation also changed in time so as to 
prevent a misconception that it was only a form of punishment. That is exactly what 
the words of Selim III refer to in explaining the situation in his era:  
.... ticaret ve sanat ve harasetle tahsil-i mal eylemiş adamlardan her kim vefat 
ederse mademki varisi vardır bir akçesi canib-i miriye alınmasın; lakin menafi-
i devletimi kendüye me’kel eyleyüb emval-i miriyeden servet kesb eylemiş 
rical ve kibardan vefat eyliyenlerin malı ne benim ve de müteveffanın ve ne 
varislerinindir; ancak beytülmal-i müslimin ve emval-i miriyenindir, tamamca 
alınır, hıfz-ı din ü devlet içün sarf eylerim.62 
 
According to this, those engaged in state affairs could abuse their authority to 
enrich themselves and this bears a certain risk and danger along with it. 
 Besides the punishment of sarrafs and their relations by the state, one might 
wonder how ordinary people thought of the sarrafs. Some travelers shared these 
thoughts, which may be considered unpleasant. Nevertheless, it is important to refer 
to traveler notes in order to understand the social views on the subject. First of all, 
many travelers unanimously observe that most of the sarrafs were Armenian.63 They 
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also record that sarrafs worked with partners; they sent their agents to collect taxes but 
the sarraf himself conducted financial transactions.64 
 Sarrafs were, in the eyes of travelers and society, people who earned much in 
a very short time. They benefited from fluctuations, working as usurers and using their 
money very carefully for maximum profit.65 Thus, the sarraf occupation was not much 
respected. 
 
 2.3.1. Execution of Sarrafs 
One of the most severe punishments for sarrafs was execution. In the list made 
by Şahiner in his thesis covering the years 1746-183966, not only the Armenians were 
subjected to execution and confiscation. The list covered 19 Armenians, 4 Jews and 3 
Rums who were executed in 93 years. 3 people were executed between 1746-1752, 
and 23 more until the 19th century. On the other hand, this list on confiscation covers 
97 years from 1755 to 1852. 16 Armenians, and 1 Jew were subjected to confiscation. 
In 1820, the inheritance of 4 Armenians was confiscated. The most important of them 
was Kazaz Artin, the private sarraf of Mahmud II. In 1828, 5 big Armenian families 
were subjected to confiscation. 
 Sarrafs most of whom were Armenian and who played an important role in 
financing tax farming, acted as mediators between officials who were involved in tax-
farming and investors. The disputes that emerged between 1844-1863 related to these 
functions are registered in the Imperial Mint registry number 167, which is the subject 
matter of this master thesis. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
AN EVALUATION OF THE IMPERIAL MINT SARRAF REGISTRY 
NUMBER 167 
 
3.1. A Short Evaluation of the Contents of the Registry 
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The Imperial Mint registry number 167 is made up of 222 pages (111 foils) 
and 625 decisions dating from the years 1844-1866. It covers the disputes related to 
the activities of Armenian sarrafs. The registry includes certain calculations to 
determine the debt of sarrafs who died, fled, or went bankrupt. The sarrafs’ creditors 
occupation, title, religion and gender are noted next to their names. 
The registry has information about 625 verdicts, the involved individuals’ 
financial profiles, and relations with sarrafs, transaction volumes and the direction of 
changes. This thesis focuses on the cases of deceased 25 bankrupt or missing sarrafs 
out of total of sarraf from the 130 sarrafs on which the registry provides information. 
Nine of the 25 sarrafs were deceased, 14 were bankrupt and 2 had fled. 
If we examine the registry’s text, the cases with verdicts show us the procedure 
that applied to sarrafs’ debts. This shows the existence of a certain system. According 
to this, the lender starts his request for payment by presenting a petition to the Bab-ı 
Ali. This is sometimes a sarraf demanding money from a state official or officer 
whether of lower or higher ranks,67 or a merchant, trader or administrator demanding 
money from sarrafs.68 Along with the borrower and lender, the kapı kethüda and some 
sarrafs from the kumpanya or lonca are summoned to the Imperial Mint and the case 
is heard and settled. Then, the Imperial Mint gives a statement (ilmuhaber) to both 
parties. The verdict is recorded in the registry. An example any case will help to 
illustrate the process.69 
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 These cases provide useful information on sarrafs transactions. Thus if a 
bankrupt sarraf was in question, he most probably couldn’t balance his debts and 
therefore declared bankruptcy when he could no longer pay his debts. The individuals 
who had transactions with this sarraf would not be able to fully collect their money 
from him so they would have to settle with the so-called gurema method or the division 
credit among creditors.70The estate of the sarraf was sold by auction. With this amount, 
together with the money he was owed, his debts are paid under the supervision of the 
Imperial Mint. The state is paid first, and then the rest of the money is split among 
investors according to their respective share.71 The Imperial Mint determined the final 
amounts paid. 
 This registry, which contains the debts of sarrafs affiliated with the Imperial 
Mint, indicates that the money is to be pruned come from the sarraf’s cash savings or 
reel estate in the case of a sarrafs deceased, bankrupt or missing. It is important to note 
that some creditors did not want the gurema method and wanted to collect their whole 
share from the sarraf. The Imperial Mint desired to close the cases where even selling 
the whole real estate of the sarraf did not cover his debts. However, the creditors had 
no other option than to accept the gurema method.72 
 When we analyze the hearings recorded in the registry, we see that at most two 
stewards are assigned to a case.73 They determine the debtors and if the sarraf has 
enough cash, a payment calendar is quickly prepared. However, especially in the case 
of bankrupt sarrafs, their real estate was sold in order to pay off debts. Other than that, 
the reel estate of the sarraf that was transferred to his relatives was also calculated in 
the payment of debts. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
amireden ba-taqrir ledel arz tesviyesine himmet olunmak babında sadır olan ferman-ı ali mucebince 
kayd olunup sarraf-ı mersum kıbeline diğer ilmuhaberi verilmeğle keyfiyyet malum olmak için 
mumaileyh Hacı Arif Ağa tarafına işbu ilmuhaber verildi. Fi 8 C sene 1260.” 
70 Gurema usulü (debt, indebted): “... Eğer borçların toplamı satışta elde edilen paralardan fazla ise 
rüçhanlı alacaklıların alacağı ödendikten sonra geriye kalan miktar belli oranla kalan borçlulara 
dağıtılır...” Fahrettin Atar, “İflas,” Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi 21 (2000): 509-512. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See BOA, DRB.d.,nr.167, p.1, h. 1. 
73 Ibid., p. 8, h. 1. “Firari sarraf Penganlı Ovanes’in bazı emval ve  zimematı mukaddemce ecille-i rical-
i devlet-i aliyyeden saadetlü atufetlü Hacı Ethem Bey Efendi hazretleri marifetiyle.... Penganlı 
Ovanes’in başka bir  hükmünde “Vüzera-i İ’zam kapu kethüdalarından  saadetlü Nesim Efendi 
hazretlerinin takdim eylediği bir kıta memhur takriri mefhumunda zimemat ve düyunun tesviyesine 
memur olduğu” şeklinde görevlendirildiğini görmek mümkündür.”  
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 The present chapter contains graphs and tables that provide an anatomy of the 
sarrafs, providing in general information on the identity of the sarrafs, the volume of 
their total transaction, the identities of depositors or and borrowers the amount of loans 
and interest rates.  
The common axis of this data is to analyze the sarrafs quantitatively and arrive 
at an evaluation. The main motivation for choosing registry number 167 of the 
Ottoman Ministry Archives is to understand the registers of the accounting and the 
circle of influence the sarrafs have within the Ottoman financial system. In the hopes 
of clearing the uncertainty covering the sarrafs, this thesis uses tables and graphics to 
achieve this cause. Answers were sought to questions such as “were sarrafs deposit 
institutions, to which groups did they supply credit, how did the existence of women 
and orphans affect sarrafs, where did the sarrafs acquire the required amount in order 
to fund the iltizam system apart from their own capital?” Such questions were 
answered through the data obtained from the graphs. The aim of such questions was 
to analyze the financial profiles of the sarrafs between 1844-1863. 
 
3.1.1. Groups in Relation with Sarrafs 
When the data about the 25 selected sarrafs in registry number 167 are graphed, 
the resulting display is this: these 25 sarrafs had relations with a total of 545 
individuals. Nine of the sarrafs died, 14 declared bankruptcy and two fled. 446 of those 
who had  relations with the sarraf were men, 64 women and 14 institutions, 12 orphans 
and 11 communities. It must be noted here that community implies a collectivity as in 
Uluköy community, or village and kesan that is group of individuals are groups of 
people with more than 11 individuals. Therefore, there must be more than 11 
individuals in a community. So the total volume of transactions must be more than 
546. Out of necessity, we had to accept each community as one relationship. 
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Figure 3.1. Total Numbers of Deceases, Bankrupt and Missing Sarrafs 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Sarrafs’ Clients 
 
3.1.2. Titles of Clients 
When we substract communities and institutions out of the 546 entries in 
relation to the sarrafs, there are 521 individuals within the transacion volume. As we 
have mentioned earlier, 446 of these are men, 64 are women, and 12 are unidentified. 
Only men out of these three groups are recorded with their titles. The titles of 301 out 
of 446 men are indicated. The titles is the remaining 145 are not menhood 99 are ağas, 
70 are efendis, 61 are beys, 40 are hocas, 16 are paşas, 13 are hacıs, and 2 are çavuşes. 
82% are ağa, efendi, bey, paşa and çavuş, and all are Muslims. The rest 18% are non-
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Muslims with hoca titles. Ağas are the most abundant with 33% while çavuşes are last 
with 1%. (See Figures 3,4,5). 
 
Figure 3.3. Titled and Untitled Clients of Sarrafs 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Percentage of Titled Clients of Sarrafs (%) 
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Figure 3.5. Numbers of Titled Persons Related with Sarrafs 
 
3.1.3. Religious Composition of Clients 
When we look at the religious affiliation of these individuals, we see that out 
of 510 people, 312 are Muslims and 213 are non-Muslims. This means that Muslims 
were the majority in this network making up 59% of the total. (See Figures 6,7) 
 
Figure 3.6- Number of Muslim and  non-Muslim Clients of Sarrafs 
 
Figure 3.6. Number of Muslim and non-Muslim Clients of Sarrafs 
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Figure 3.7. Percentage of Muslim and non-Muslim Clients of Sarrafs  
 
3.1.3.1. Muslims 
Out of 312 Muslims in this group, 259 or 85% were men and 45 or 15% were 
women (See Figures 8, 9). 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Sarrafs’ Muslim Clients by Gender (Numbers) 
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Figure 3.9. Sarrafs’ Muslim Clients by Gender  
 
3.1.3.2. Non-Muslims 
The non-Muslim group is comprised of 187 men making up 91% of the total 
and 18 women that make up 18%. When Muslim and non-Muslim women are 
compared, we see that non-Muslim women were fewer in percentage (See Figures 
10,11). 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Sarrafs’ non-Muslim Clients by Gender (Numbers) 
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Figure 3.11. Sarrafs’ non-Muslim Clients in Percentages  
 
3.1.4. Occupation of Clients 
One of the most important information this registry under survey us is the 
occupations of those who did business with sarrafs network. In total, the occupation 
of 248 creditors or 48% are given. There are 79 distinct occupations. (for occupations 
and number see Figure 12 and Table 1) 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Distribution of Clients by Occupation 
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The number of Muslims with a known occupation are 119 while non-Muslims 
are 129. The numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims occupations whose are not 
indicated are 192 and 81, respectively. As we can see, although the numbers look equal 
between Muslims and whose occupations are known, this corresponds to 38.1% of the 
total in the case of muslims, and 60.5 %in the case of non-Muslims. 
 
Table 3.1. Occupations by Numbers 
Job Num. Job Num. Job Num. Job Num. 
İhtisab 
Çukadarı 1 Çavuş 1 Ferik 1 Kadı 4 
Ahali 2 Çorbacı 1 Gulam 2 
Kalemiye 
Çukadarı 1 
Anbarcı 1 Defter Emini 1 Güherçileci 1 Kalfa 1 
Anbarcı 1 Defterdar 4 Hakim 1 
Kapu 
Kahyası 1 
Asakir-i 
Bahriye 1 Dellal 1 Hamamcı 1 Kapucubaşı 2 
Ayvaz 1 Duhancı 1 Hasırcı 2 Kasap 2 
Bakkal 1 Düğmeci 1 Hazinedar 1 Katib 8 
Barutçu 2 Ekmekçi 3 İplikçi 1 Kavas 1 
Bezirgan 8 Enfiyeci 1 K. Çukadarı 9 Kaymakam 5 
Celeb 4 Esnaf 2 K.Kethüdası 4 Keresteci 1 
Kömürcü 1 Muhasebeci 2 Poliçeci 3 Tercüman 1 
Kuyumcu 4 Mutasarrıf 1 Sarraf 79 Tüccar 6 
Lala 2 Mübayaacı 3 
Sarraf 
Kethüdası 1 Vali 1 
Mabeynci 1 Müderris 6 
Sarraflar 
Kahyası 1 Veznedar 1 
Mad. Kay. 1 Mdr.Hacegan 7 Ser Etibba 1 Voyvoda 12 
Maliye 
Mektupçusu 1 Mültezim 3 Silahdar 1 Yağlıkçı 1 
Mehterbaşı 1 Müste'men 1 Sülükçü 1 Yazıcı 6 
Miralay 1 Müşir 2 Şatır 1 
Zahire 
Müdürü 1 
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Table 3.1. (continued) 
Mismarcı 1 Naib 2 
Tahsildar-
Mütesellim 3    
Muhafız 1 Nakkaş 1 Tebaa 8    
 
It is possible to group these 79 occupations as administrator-official, sarraf, 
merchant, trader, scholar, military, community and foriegner. When we evaluate the 
distribution of sarrafs’ clients according to these eight different occupation groups, 99 
are administrators, 92 are sarrafs, 22 are traders, 21 are merchants, 12 are scholars and 
and , 5 are people.  2 are communities and 1 is a foreigner. This means that the 
administrators and officials make up 77% of the clients (See Figures 13,14). 
 
 
Figure 3.13. Sarrafs and Occupation Clients 
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Figure 3.14. Sarrafs and Percentage of Occupation Clients 
 
3.2. Dead, Bankrupt a Missing Sarrafs  
 Out of the 25 sarrafs emphasized here, 56% or 14 were bankrupt, 36% or 9 
were deceased and 8% or 2 were missing. It is better to group categorize these sarrafs 
as dead and bankrupt or missing together in order to better understand their 
connections. It will be revealed wheter there is any difference between these two 
groups. It will be especially useful to find out why some sarrafs went bankrupt or fled. 
(See Figure 15). 
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Figure 3.15. Deceased, Bankrupt and Missing Sarrafs: Amounts of Credit and Debt (in 
kurushes) 
 
The 9 deceased sarrafs and 16 who fled or went bankrupt show that the total 
number of people in the dead sarrafs’ transactions is 101, while the total number of 
people in the bankrupt or missing sarrafs’ transaction is 443. 
 
3.2.1. Deceased Sarrafs 
When we look at the number of people in relation with the deceased sarrafs, 
we find 101 individuals. This corresponds to 36% overall. We know the gender of 94 
of them, 87 or 92% of them were men, 7 or 8% were women. When we look at their 
religions, we see that 62% were Muslims, 42% were non-muslims. When we look at 
their occupations, we see that most had relations with government officials followed 
by sarrafs and merchants. It is interesting that there is no trader affiliated with any 
deceased sarraf. Their relations with the community and orphans are more than their 
relations with the military personel and scholars. (See Figure 16). 
 
 
 
0
2000000
4000000
6000000
8000000
10000000
12000000
14000000
Deceases Bankrupt Missing
Credit 7301399 7599699,5 1960455
Debt 6701233 13996141 2343678
40 
 
Figure 3.16. Deceased Sarrafs: Numbers of Creditors and Debtors 
 
3.2.2. Relations of Bankrupt and Missing Sarrafs 
 Those who were missing were generally considered to have fled with the fear 
of bankruptcy. This group was affiliated with total of 443 people. This corresponds to 
81% of the total volume of transactions. Out of 443 people, 358 are men, 56 are 
women. 246 of them bear a title, and 111 do not. There are 257 Muslims and 171 non-
Muslims. According to occupations, the administrator and sarraf amounts are very 
close. There are 13 merchants. While the deceased sarrafs, did not have artisans among 
their clients, the bankrupt and missing sarrafs had 22. There is nearly no community. 
Orphans and institutions are the same with merchants (See Figure 17). 
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Figure 3.17. Bankrupt and Missing Sarrafs: Numbers of Creditors and Debtors 
 
According to these data, if we compare the deceased sarrafs with those who 
fled or went bankrupt, the number of men are higher than those of cases. The same 
holds for religion. Looking at occupations, administrators and sarrafs are higher in 
both cases while the number of administrators is equal to sarrafs. The number of 
merchants is lower but while there is no trader in the missing sarraf group, there are 
22 of them in the bankruptcy group. In the deceased sarraf group, the amount of 
community is higher. The amount of orphans and institutions in the other group are 
higher (See Figure 17). 
 
3.3. Volume of Transactions: Relation of Sarrafs with Different Groups of 
People 
3.3.1. Titled 
The total volume of transaction by 25 sarrafs with 546 people is 39,986,605.50 
kuruşes. That means an average of 1,600,000 kuruşes per sarraf. The debt owed to the 
sarrafs is 42% of the total volume or 16,945,53,50 kuruşes. Debts make up 58% which 
amount to 23,041,052 kuruşes. The average debt owed to a sarraf is 677,822 kuruşes 
while the average owed by the sarrafs is 921,642 kuruşes. The average amount of 
42 
transactions for 546 people is  73,370 kuruşes 32% or 174 of the 546 people in the 
survey owed. In return, the sarrafs owed to 68% or 371 people. In the total transaction 
volume, out of the total 22 people per sarraf, 7 owe them and 15 are owed to (See 
Figures 18,19). 
 
 
Figure 3.18. Total Amount of Sarrafs’ Credit and Debt (in kuruşes) 
 
 
Figure 3.19. Percentage of the Total Amount of Sarrafs’ Credit and Debt 
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3.3.2. Gender 
3.3.2.1. Men 
Out of the 546 people, 446 were men. 158 of them were owed 13,813,632 
kuruşes and 288 owed 13,482,242.5 kuruşes. Of the credits the sarraf has lent, he is 
owed 87,428 kuruşes. In return, he owes probable depositors 46,813 kuruşes per capita 
(See Figures 20, 21). 
 
 
Figure 3.20. Sarrafs and Men: Number of Debtors and Creditors 
 
 
Figure 3.21. Sarrafs and Men: Percentage of Debtors and Creditors 
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3.3.2.2. Women 
63 women dealt with the sarrafs in question .18 of whom were non-Muslims 
and 46 were Muslims them.  Jointly, women had a total transaction volume of 
1,446,455 kuruşes, which was entirely owed to. This means women were all investors. 
They were owed 22,959 kuruşes per capita (See Figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Sarrafs and Women: Number of Debtors and Creditors 
 
3.3.3. Sarrafs and Communities 
There are 11 units identified as communities in sarrafs’ transactions. I 
mentioned earlier that we took each community as one person. The total volume of 
transaction involving communities was 4,869,895 kuruşes. The 56% (2,749,878 
kuruşes) of it was debt to sarrafs and 44% (2,120,017 kuruşes) was debt to 
communities. The average amount per community is 442,717 kuruşes. This is quite 
high when compared to other groups. So it may be possible to give an appoximate 
number depending on the average 73,370 kuruşes per person with 546 people in total. 
If we divide 4,869,895 by 73,370, the resulting number is 66. Ergo, each community 
should have approximately six individuals in them (See Figures 23,24). 
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Figure 3.23. Sarrafs and Communities: Number of Creditors and Debtors 
 
 
Figure 3.24. Sarrafs and Communities: Percantage of Creditors and Debtors 
 
3.3.4. Sarrafs and Institutions 
Within the trading volume of the money-changing sector, institutions constitute 
another group. These institutions include patriarchates, churches, the treasury, and 
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foundations. The total of their trading volume is 871,748 kuruşes 29% of this total 
amount, or (250,394.5 kuruşes), is the debt owed to the money-changer, who was the 
creditor. The remaining 71%, which equals to 621,353.5, is the debt to be paid by the 
money-changer, who was the debtor. The share of each of these 13 institutions is 
approximately 67,057 kuruşes (See Figures 25, 26). 
 
 
Figure 3.25. Sarrafs and Institutions: The numbers of Creditors and Debtors 
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Figure 3.26. Sarrafs and Institutions: Percentage of Creditors and Debtors 
 
3.3.5. Sarrafs and Orphans 
The last group that was active in the money-changing sector was orphans. The 
trading volume of the total of 12 orphans equals to 5,691,719 kuruşes. The trading 
volume for each orphan is 474,309 kuruşes. The whole of the remaining part is 
recorded as debt for the money-changer. In comparison with other groups, the 
transaction volume per capita is quite high for orphans. Consequently, we can argue 
that money-changers occupy an important position in the management of the goods of 
orphans. This fact can also be provided by the goods of orphans. One can say that both 
groups, money-changers and orphans, have had mutually beneficial relations. (See 
Figure 27). 
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Figure 3.27. Sarrafs and Orphans: Number of Creditors and Debtors 
 
3.3.6. Number of Titled and Untitled Persons doing Business with Sarrafs 
Out of the 446 people working in the sarraf sector, 301 had titles and 145 did 
not as I have mentioned earlier. The total volume of 446 people is 26,361,381 kuruşes 
that 15,592,329 kuruş belongs to titled clients and 10,769,052 kuruş belongs to untitled 
clients.  The average amount per person is 59,106 kuruş (See Figure 28). 
 
 
Figure 3.28. Number of Titled and Untitled Persons doing Business with Sarrafs 
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3.3.6.1. Untitled  
In the untitled group, the sarrafs are indebted by 43 people at 21%, which is 
2,295,390 kuruş, and owe 102 people 79%, which is 8,473,662 kuruş (See 29).  
 
 
Figure 3.29. Sarrafs and Untitled Persons: Percentage of Credits and Debts 
 
3.3.6.2. Sarrafs and Titled Persons: Amount of Credit and Debt (in 
kurushes) 
The total volume of transaction for the 301 titled people within the sarraf sector 
is 15,592,329 kuruş. The average amount per person is 51,801 kuruş. 42 %, which is 
5,215,647.5 kuruş belonging to paşa, 24%, which is 3,693,577.5 kuruş to efendi, 23% 
which is 2,203,668.5 kuruş to ağa, 10%, which is 1,292,203 kuruş to bey, and the 
remaining 1 % or 3,187,242.5 kuruş to hoca, çavuş, hoca titled groups (See Figure 
30,31). 
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Figure 3.30. Sarrafs and Titled Persons: Amount of Credit and Debt (in kurushes) 
 
 
Figure 3.31. Sarrafs and Titled Persons: Percentage of Credit and Debt 
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3.3.7. Sarrafs and non-Muslims doing Business with them: Number of 
Creditors and Debtors 
If one splits the total volume of transactions within the sarraf sector into 
Muslim and non-Muslim groups according to religious affiliation is 31,084,670 kuruş. 
The total volume of transactions belongs to non-Muslims is 11,516,102 kuruş and 
19,568,568 kuruş which belongs to Muslims. The total number of Muslims in business 
is 312 and make up a total transaction volume of 19,568,568 kuruş. The average 
amount of volume per Muslim is 62,719 kuruş. 57% or 11,196,896 kuruş is owed to 
sarrafs, while 43% or 8,371,672 kuruş is the debt owed by sarrafs (See Figure 32). 
 
 
Figure 3.32. Sarrafs and non-Muslims doing Business with them: Number of Creditors 
and Debtors 
 
3.3.7.1. Sarrafs and non-Muslims doing Business with them: Percentage 
of Credit and Debt  
The total number of non-muslims in business is 213 and make up a total 
transaction volume of 11,516,102 kuruş. The average amount of volume per non-
Muslim is 54,066 kuruş. 26% or 2.940.039 kuruş is owed to sarrafs, while 74% or 
8.576.063 kuruş is the debt owed by sarrafs (See Figures 33, 34). 
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Figure 3.33. Sarrafs and non-Muslims doing Business with them: Credit and Debt (in 
kurushes) 
 
 
Figure 3.34. Sarrafs and non-Muslims doing Business with them: Percentage of Credit 
and Debt 
 
3.3.8. Sarrafs and Occupation Clients: Amounts of Credit and Debt 
3.3.8.1. Sarrafs and Administrative People: Credit and Debt (in kurushes) 
The number of administrative in the sarraf sector is 99 and this makes up for a 
total transaction volume of 8.195.879 kuruş. 26 % or 2.161.412 kuruş is the amount 
owed to sarrafs, while the remaining 74% or 6.034.467 kuruş is their debts. When 
compared to other occupations, administrative groups have the greatest amount of 
transaction volume. While the administrative owe 21,832 kuruş to sarrafs per person, 
the amount owed by sarrafs per person is 60,954 kuruş (See Figures 35,36). 
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Figure 3.35. Sarrafs and Administrative People: Credit and Debt (in kurushes) 
 
 
Figure 3.36. Sarrafs and Administrative People: Percentage of Credit and Debt 
 
3.3.8.2. Sarrafs and Merchants: Amount of Credit and Debt (in kuruşes) 
The total amount of transactions of the 21 merchants is 1,989,840 kuruş. 21% 
or 412,695 kuruş of this amount is the amount owed to sarrafs, while the remaining 
79% or 1,577,145 kuruş is the amount owed by sarrafs to merchants. The average 
amount of debt for 21 merchants per person is 19,652 kuruş. The amount owed to them 
per person is 75,102 kuruş. In light of this data, it is possible to conclude that merchants 
have deposited capital to sarrafs (See Figures 37-38). 
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Figure 3.37. Sarrafs and Merchants: Amount of Credit and Debt (in kurushes) 
 
 
Figure 3.38. Sarrafs and Merchants: Percantage of Credit and Debt 
 
3.3.8.3. Sarrafs and Guilds: Amount of Credit and Debt 
The total volume of transaction of 22 tradesmen working in the sarraf sector 
is 341, 613,5 kuruş. 17% or 59,050 kuruş of this amount is owed to sarrafs, and the 
remaining 83% or 282,563,5 kuruş is debt. The average debt per tradesman is 2,684 
kuruş while the amount they are owed per person is 12,843 kuruş (See Figures 39,40). 
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Figure 3.39. Sarrafs and Guilds: Amount of Credit and Debt (in kuruşes) 
 
 
Figure 3.40. Sarrafs and Guilds: Percantage of Credit and Debt 
 
3.3.8.4. Sarrafs and Scholars: Amount of Credit and Debt 
The total volume of transaction of the 12 scholars in the sarraf sector is 
346,446,5 kuruş. 33% or 116,014 kuruş of this amount is owed to the sarrafs while 
the remaining 67% or 230,432,5 kuruş stands for their debt. The average debt per 
person is 9,668 kuruş while the amount owed to them is 19,202 kuruş per person (See 
Figures 41,42).  
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Figure 3.41. Sarrafs and Scholars: Amount of Credit and Debt (in kurushes) 
 
 
Figure 3.42. Sarrafs and Scholars: Percentage of Credit and Debt 
 
3.3.8.5. Sarrafs and Military People: Amount of Credit and Debt 
The total volume of transaction for the sarrafs with military personnel is 
888,324 kuruş. 93% or 828,600 kuruş is owed to the sarrafs, while %7 or 59,724 kuruş 
stands for their debt. The average amount of debt per person is 165,720 kuruş while 
the amount owed to them per person is 11,944 kuruş (See Figures 43,44). 
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Figure 3.43. Sarrafs and Military People: Amount of Credit and Debt (in kurushes) 
 
 
Figure 3.44. Sarrafs and Military People: Percentage of Credit and Debt 
 
3.3.8.6. Sarrafs and the Occupations of Their Clients: Amounts of Credit 
and Debt (in kurushes) 
In the table below, which shows the amount owed and debts according to 
different occupations, the total volume of transaction is 18,223,166 kuruş. 9,446,792 
kuruş of this amount is the credit given by the sarraf to that specific occupation group 
while 8,776,374 kuruş is the amount owed by the sarraf to that group. It is important 
to note here that the total amount of debt and lien is different than the one given in this 
graphic. This difference is caused because the accounts of women, orphans and 
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institutions are not added. This is because women, orphans and institutions are not 
considered occupation groups, and this causes the difference between credit and debt. 
When one considers the 8 different occupations given, 99 are manager-officers, 
92 are sarrafs, 22 are tradesmen, 21 are merchants, 12 are scholars, 5 are military 
personnel, 2 are community and 1 is foreign. The greatest amount of debts and liens in 
the graphic belong to the manager-officers. The amount owed to the sarraf is 
6,034,467 kuruş while the debt is 2,161,412 kuruş. The surplus debt owed to the 
sarrafs represents the amount of credit taken from the sarrafs in order to function in 
the iltizam system. According to this, the existence of a large amount of shares by the 
manager-officers shows the existence of mültezims in the system. The amount of debt 
per person of the managers to the sarrafs is 60,954 kuruş, while they are owed 21,832 
kuruş. The second most voluminous group is the debts among the sarrafs themselves. 
The 25 sarrafs examined are owed 1,930,841 kuruş while their debt is 4,459,897 
kuruş. What is important here is that a sarraf does not deposit capital to a fellow sarraf, 
but lends credit; thus forming a kind of partnership. Accordingly, the amount of debt 
per sarraf is 20,987 kuruş while 48,477 kuruş is owed to them. The amount of debt 
owed by the merchants is 412,695 kuruş while they are owed 1,577,145 kuruş, which 
shows that they had capital and deposited money to the sarrafs. On the contrary with 
military personnel, the amount of credit taken from the sarrafs is much higher than 
their deposits (See Figures 45, 46).  
 
 
Figure 3.45. Sarrafs and Occupations of Their Clients: Credit and Debt (in kurushes) 
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Figure 3.46. Sarrafs and the Occupations of Their Clients: Percentages of Total Credit 
and Debt 
 
3.3.8.7. Sarrafs and the Occupations of Their Clients: Percentages of Total 
Credit and Debt  
With relation to the prior graphic, the percentage of the debts of the sarrafs and 
the occupations are shown. 45% or 8,195,879 kuruş of the total volume of transaction 
stands for the manager-officer group, 35% or 6,390,738 kuruş stands for the sarraf 
group. The two graphics given below allow one to determine the accounts of sarrafs 
by analyzing the occupational groups of those who have relations to the sarrafs by 
showing the amount owed and the debt of the sarrafs; thus determining the areas in 
which the sarrafs functioned. As mentioned before, sarrafs gave credit to iltizam 
owners and financed the system, and borrowed from other sarrafs to form 
partnerships. The interesting development in the occupation groups is the existence of 
merchants, scholars, tradesmen, and foreigners that deposit capital to the sarrafs (See 
Figure 47).  
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Figure 3.47. Sarrafs and The Occupations of Their Clients: Total Amounts of the 
Process (in kurushes) 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
 
This work thesis addresses the qualitative and quantitative changes in the 
functions of the sarrafs within a 20-year frame (1844-1863) by extracting a general 
portrait of the Ottoman sarrafs and approaching the structural features of the sarrafs 
as a tradesman network in the Ottoman financial system. Sarrafs secured an important 
role in the Ottoman financial system through money exchange, and by supplying the 
mint with silver and becoming financiers of the iltizam sector, providing credit to the 
managing group.  
The main purpose of this work is to analyze the anatomy of the sarrafs via 
quantitative analysis of documents obtained from the archives. By doing so one can 
also examine the most important functions of the sarrafs as an important part of the 
Ottoman financial system.  The findings will help fill in an important gap in the 
literature. The 20-year period (1844-1863) especially examined in the mint register 
covers cases on the relations the sarrafs formed throughout the Tanzimat era. The 
changes in the quality and quantity of the cases considered in this research had direct 
influence on the interpretation of relations. I observed that the first-degree iltizams of 
the sarrafs were managing-officers while second-degree relations were with other 
sarrafs. It is natural 75% of all relations of the sarrafs were constituted this way. This 
is because the main function of the sarrafs was to finance the iltizam sector. However, 
this was only one of the important aspects of the relations the sarrafs had. The other 
was the capital required for funding finance. The different compositions of the groups 
to which they owed money and an analysis of the groups with which they were in 
relation, with regards to their main function allows one to determine their positions in 
the Ottoman socio-economic circle. 
The vast majority of the works done on sarrafs are dependent on secondary 
literature and transcriptions of the archives, which cause a stalemate while studying 
this subject. The existence of Armenian sources and quantitative analysis of the 
archives shows the need for further studies on sarrafs. The lack of Armenian sources 
especially when studying this subject leaves an important area of this work in the dark. 
To cite an example from the first chapter, H. Barsoumian who works on Armenian 
62 
sarrafs examined how sarrafs gather capital before starting their occupation through 
various Armenian sources.  
The accounts of sarrafs were analyzed and the volume and sources of capital 
deposited for the iltizam system was presented in the tables and this allows the 
gathering of knowledge on the financial transactions and the relations or sarrafs to 
other groups. According to this, the tables present the macro amounts from micro 
groups. This gives an idea as to the sources of the capital and their partnerships along 
with their credit relations, and it can be seen that the sarrafs were working as banks in 
the contemporary sense. 
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APPENDIX 
 
FIRST PAGE OF IMPERIAL MINT’S REGISTER NUMBER 167 
 
SAYFA: 1 
 
Hüküm:1 
SARRAF TAİFESİNDEN SURET-İ İFLASINI İZHAR EDEN KİMROYA ZİMMİNİN BAZI 
KESANDA OLAN MATLUBATI ESHAB-I DÜYUNUNA GUREMATEN TESVİYE 
OLUNMASINA DAİR İLMUHABERDİR SARRAF-I MERSUMUN BAZI KESANDA OLAN 
MATLUBATININ MİKTARI: 
 
ALACAKLARI                                                                                GURUŞ 
 
KASPAR BAZİRGANDAN                                                                 40.000 
KÖSE MEHMET PAŞA YEĞENİ HÜSEYİN BEYDEN                          82.000 (YEKUN) 
MADEN-İ HÜMAYUN VE VOYVODASI MEHMET AĞADAN         15.000 
GELGELOĞLU YEĞENİ KİRKOR’DAN                                                   2.300 
 
MİNHA MERSUMUN BAZI KESANA OLAN DÜYUNUNUN MİKTARI: 509.000 
 
                                                                                                   GURUŞ 
İSMAİL BEY’E                                                                               120.000 
İSMAİL BEYZADE ALİ BEY’E                                                            50.000 
TINGIROĞLU HOCA MİKAİL’E                                                            78.000 
MADEN KAYMAKAMI MEHMET AĞA’YA                                         51.000 
UZUN ARTİN OĞLU HOCA ARTİN’E                                               23.000 
CEZAYİRLİOĞLU HOCA SERKİS’E                                               40.000 
SARRAF YARNIKOĞLU’NA  (?)                                                              8.000 
SARRAF İSTEFAN’A                                                                              20.000 
SARRAF HAÇADOR’A                                                                           25.000 
SARRAF NİKOĞOS’A                                                                           12.500 
HACI AGOP’A                                                                                    9.000 
HACI OVANES’E                                                                                 2.500 
HACI KALBOSA’YA                                                                              7.300 
MARDİROS ZİMMİYE                                                                           2.900 
HAMAMCI OSMAN EFENDİYE                                                            15.000 
NALLIHAN VOYVODASI MEHMET AĞAYA                                         8.200 
OSMAN PAŞA GULAMI HÜSREV AĞAYA                                              3.000 
ARAPKİRİ İBRAHİM AĞAYA                                                                   4.000 
KASIM AĞAYA                                                                                      4.500 
ŞEYH MUSTAFA EFENDİYE                                                                     9.000 
ESNAFANA                                                                                         16.500 
